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1. Introduction  
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
importance of the Court’s independence was repeatedly stressed. At the time, delegations 
understood independence to mean a resistance to political influence, especially originating 
from States. 1 As one delegate put it, ‘the Court should be…independent of any political 
influence, and its judgements should be given exclusively on the basis of law.’2  In the view of 
another delegate, the Court’s independence would resist political pressure that consisted of ‘the 
particular rather than the universal, the exclusive rather than the inclusive.’ 3 The general 
consensus was the Court would displace complaints of ‘victor’s justice’ by emancipating law 
from the machinations of politics. Hence, the Court was founded on a peak confidence in 
legalism: an ideological belief in law’s superiority to politics.4     
Today, optimism in the Court’s legalism has long since waned. More than fifteen years 
since the Court opened, faith in its independence has undergone a deep malaise, particularly on 
the African continent.5 Distrust has been frequently attributed to the Court’s ‘engine room’: 
The Office of the Prosecutor.6 Arguably its most public face, the Office is perceived to be 
synonymous with the Court because its prosecutorial selections are pivotal and tend to draw 
the most criticism. Those objections begin with the Prosecutor’s investigations focusing—
almost exclusively— on African States. 7 Furthermore all of the Court’s trials and the resulting 
                                                          
1 See the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute (ICCst.): Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings 
of the Committee of the Whole’ UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court (Rome 15th June -17th July 1998) A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II). For example, the Iraqi Delegate remarked  ‘..the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court should contain clear principles that [confirm] its neutrality and objectivity, its 
independent role and freedom from the political influences of States and international organisations’) para. 33 at 116. 
2 Ibid. para. 41, at 67. 
3 Ibid. para. 9, at 73. 
4 E. A.  Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (2009), 21.  
5 See below.  
6 ‘Office’ hereafter.  
7 There are open investigations in Burundi, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, two in the Central African Republic, 
Sudan (Darfur), Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. At the time of writing is the only investigation beyond the African continent is 
in Georgia. On the 20th of November 2017 the Prosecutor requested authorisation from the Court to initiate an investigation 
into crimes committed in Afghanistan. For a current list see ICC ‘Situations under Investigation’ available at <//www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx>  
2 
 
eight convictions have been of nationals of African states.8 In addition, concerns are raised 
about the Prosecutor’s lack of even-handedness in selecting cases across opposing parties to a 
conflict. These concerns have led to a critique of ‘lawfare’9, and often arises when the 
Prosecutor has an unduly close relationship to a government that, de facto, shields the state 
from criminal investigations.10 Finally and more in general, selections that begin with a UNSC 
referral also attract opposition. For instance, the UNSC’s triggering of the Court’s jurisdiction 
in the situations in Libya and Sudan has underlined the criticism that the Prosecutor is subject 
to the vagaries of global geo-power politics.11  
Unsurprisingly, many African governments have become deeply opposed to the Court 
and have helped generate a narrative about its political bias. The governments of Uganda and 
Sudan have been regular critics, and, notoriously, the Kenyan government actively campaigned 
against the Court and its Prosecutor.12  Such has been the widespread perception of the Court’s 
bias that South Africa and Gambia have attempted to withdraw from the Rome Statute, before 
Burundi, recently, became the first state to formally do so.13 At the 2017 African Union 
                                                          
8 Five of these convictions were the obstruction of the administration of justice and the tampering of witness evidence. See 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala 
Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, 19th October 2016). 
The remaining ‘core’ convictions are those of Thomas Lubanga in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute,  ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012; Germain Katanga in The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga. 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, 7 March 2014 and Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi in The 
Prosecutor v Al Faqi Al Mahdi Judgment and Sentence ICC-01/12-01/15-171 27 September 2016. The ICC Appeals Chamber 
recently overturned the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba for crimes against humanity and war crimes; See The Prosecutor v 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Judgment on the appeal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III ‘Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute’, ICC 01-05-01-08 A 8 June 2018. 
9 The premise of ‘lawfare’ is the use of the Court to attach scrutiny and stigma to political adversaries. See A. Tiemessen, ‘The 
International Criminal Court and the Lawfare of Judicial Intervention’ (2015) International Relations 1. 
10 A notable example is the self- referral by the Ugandan Government for crimes committed by members of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, including its leader Joseph Kony. The referral subsequently led to a perception that the Prosecutor was blind 
to atrocities committed by Ugandan Government forces. See P S. Wegner, The International Criminal Court in Ongoing 
Intrastate Conflicts: Navigating the Peace-Justice Divide (2015), 187-197. 
11 For an overview of the ‘politics’ of prosecution decisions see A. Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the 
politics of prosecutions’ (2014) 18  International Journal of Human Rights 444.  
12 See, indicatively, C. Gaffey, ‘Uganda: Museveni Calls ICC ‘Useless’…’ 13 May 2016 available at 
<www.newsweek.com/uganda-museveni-prompts-western-leaders-walkout-icc-useless-459605> and generally A. Taylor, 
‘Why so many African leaders hate the International Criminal Court’ 15 June 2015 available at 
<www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-so-many-african-leaders-hate-the-international-criminal-
court/?utm_term=.782bf65a4c89> For a discussion on how Kenyan leaders, in particular Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, 
campaigned against the ICC, see L. Nicholls, The International Criminal Court and the End of Impunity in Kenya (2015), 133-
176. 
13 Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute took effect on 27 October 2017. See UN Burundi: Withdrawal Reference: 
C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification) www.treaties.un.org/doc/publication/cn/2016/cn.805.2016-
eng.pdf  The South African government, after a domestic legal challenge, retracted their intention to withdraw from the Rome 
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summit, the sentiments of many governments were expressed in a strategy that contemplated a 
collective withdrawal from the Rome Statute, and which  began by declaring the Court was 
‘riddled with… struggles over its perceived legitimacy’.14   
Poor perceptions from African governments have come to be expected, but the 
Prosecutor has persistently distinguished the importance of ‘affected communities’. 15 
Prosecutions are conducted in the name of these communities (comprised of victims and those 
most affected by alleged crimes) and they are the essential audience where justice must be seen 
to be done.16 Evidence from the ICTY and ICTR indicates that perceptions of political bias 
among such communities can be highly damaging to a tribunal’s perceived legitimacy. 17 Of 
course, these perceptions are shaped by a multitude of factors including ethnic affiliations, 
psychological biases and media distortions.18  Nonetheless,  the ICC’s effectiveness depends 
on attracting perceived legitimacy among affected communities if justice—whenever it 
comes—is to be seen to be done. 19  In this regard there is some cause to be optimistic about 
                                                          
Statute, but is currently considering alternative options. The President of Gambia has also restored the country’s commitment 
to the Rome Statute after the previous incumbent of the Presidency had labelled the Court racist and declared an intent to 
withdraw. See BBC News, ‘South Africa Revokes ICC Withdrawal after Court ruling 8 March 2017 available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39204035>; P. Saine and L. Jahateh, ‘Gambia announces plans to stay in 
International Criminal Court’ (13 February 2017) available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-justice-icc/gambia-
announces-plans-to-stay-in-international-criminal-court-idUSKBN15S2HF> .  
14 For the original draft AU strategy see ‘Withdrawal Strategy Document’ (Draft 2)’ (12 January 2017) available 
at<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf>. See also Elise Keppler, 
‘AU’s ICC Withdrawal Strategy Less than Meets the Eye: Opposition to Withdrawal by States’ < 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/01/aus-icc-withdrawal-strategy-less-meets-eye>  
15 See, indicatively ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at a press conference in 
Uganda: justice will ultimately be dispensed for LRA crimes available at < https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-27-02-2015-ug> and F. Bensouda, ‘Our Resolve to Create a More Just World Must 
Remain Firm’ (3 September 2015) available at <www.ictj.org/debate/article/our-resolve-create-more-just-world-must-remain-
firm>. 
16 International Criminal Court Strategic Plan 2013-2017 (interim update July 2015), at 6 (Judicial and Prosecutorial Goal 1.7); 
‘Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/5/12 (29 September 2006), at 3.  
17 For example; J. N. Clark, International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the ICTY (2014); S. Ford, ‘A 
Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms’ (2012) 45 V and. J. Transnat'l L 405, at 458-468; S. K. Ivkovich and J. Hagan, Reclaiming 
Justice: The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Local Courts (2011) 
18 See, for example, M. Milanović, ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Post-Mortem’ (2016) 
110 AJIL 233. 
19 J.  Ramji-Nogales, ‘Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach’ (2010) 32(1) Michigan Journal 
of International Law 1, 15; Y. M. Dutton, ‘Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International Criminal Court’s Domestic 
Perception Challenge’ 10 August 2017, 56 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 70 
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the Court’s effectiveness,20 but it remains imperative for the Court to be seen as legitimate 
within the communities, that, ultimately, help to achieve its mandate.  
 In this context, this article enquires into the Office’s ability to persuade affected 
communities that the Court is politically independent. Specifically, the article analyses rhetoric; 
understood as the use of persuasive language, either verbal or written, directed towards given 
audiences. 21 The analysis focuses on the Office’s ‘public communications’, namely its own 
projection of information to an audience external to the organisation.  These are in contrast to 
organisational communications that have an internal audience, such as the Prosecutor’s 
courtroom advocacy which is confined to the particulars of the case and is generally directed 
towards the bench. 22 The article selects rhetoric used to defend, explain or otherwise convey 
the Court’s political independence and, specifically, targets expressions of legalism. These 
expressions are pervasively found across the Office’s public communications, and is a self-
evident choice because legalism countervails politics; by definition, it is ‘sealed off from 
politics, and cannot…amount to political preference.’23 Fundamentally, legalism is used as a 
legitimation strategy; providing justifications that seek to attribute validity (and inspire 
confidence) in the Office’s decision-making.24 The ensuing analysis reveals the limits of 
legalism’s persuasiveness but first the article begins by establishing the significance of the 
Office’s rhetoric. 
                                                          
20 A recent survey in Kenya of 507 randomly selected individuals found only 34.3% agreed with the statement ‘The 
International Criminal Court, ICC, or The Hague is biased against Africa.’ In particular victims—defined as those who suffered 
or observed violence—revealed 60% disagreed with the statement that the Court is biased. See T. Alleblas et al, ‘Is the 
International Criminal Court biased against Africans? Kenyan Victims don’t think so’ The Washington Post (6 March 2017); 
Y. Dutton et al, ‘Collective Identity, Memories of Violence and Belief in a Biased International Criminal Court: Evidence 
from Kenya’ (22 August 2017) available at < www.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3014844> .  
21 See C. Soanes and A. Stevenson (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of English (2010), 1524. This accords with James Boyd White’s 
definition; the art of ‘establishing the probable by arguing from our sense of the probable’; J. B White, ‘Law as Rhetoric, 
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life’ (1985) 52 U Chi L Rev 684, at 687. 
22 See generally, M. F. Hoffman and D. J. Ford, Organisational Rhetoric: Situations and Strategies (2010), 209-232. 
23  The use of legalism is related to demonstrating the Office’s impartiality in its prosecution selections. Impartiality and 
independence are closely linked; the former denoting the equal and fair treatment of cases and the latter referring to freedom 
and the absence of external affiliation or interference. The lack of independence provides grounds to question the existence of 
impartiality, but the converse is true; the existence of impartiality supports a claim to independence. See Stevenson, supra note 
21, at 888; Luc Côte, ‘Independence and Impartiality’ in Luc Reydams et al (eds.), International Prosecutors (2012), 357-9; 
On legitimation, see generally, T. Dickson, ‘Shklar’s Legalism and the Liberal Paradox’ (2015) 22(2) Constellations 188, at 
196. 
24 R. Cipriani, ‘The Sociology of Legitimation: an Introduction’ (1987) 35(2) Current Sociology 1. 
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2. Rhetoric 
The study of rhetoric has long been a part of the ‘law and literature’ movement. 25 Law 
has been described as the ‘very profession of rhetoric’26 and legal argumentation and advocacy 
is interwoven with persuasion. 27 However, hitherto, there has been limited research exploring 
its role in respect of the ICC.  Existing literature has tended to subsume rhetoric found in 
announcements, declarations or statements for case-specific purposes, or within notions such 
as ‘dialogue’ or ‘practice’.28 Similarly, the literature on the Court and legalism has focused on 
their general relationship with one another, rather than a particular actor’s use of legalism in 
their rhetoric. 29 Put another way, literature on the Court has lacked a discrete treatment of 
rhetoric that distinguishes an actor, a context and the content of the rhetoric being 
communicated. The present article compensates for the lack of specificity by distinguishing the 
Office, a context of distrust in the Court’s political independence, and the content of legalism. 
In so doing, the article stimulates reflections about the Office’s discursive conventions that 
may resonate with other international legal actors. In this light, the Office’s rhetoric is 
significant for, at least, three reasons.   
First, rhetoric is significant because its function of persuasion depends on the audience 
to whom the rhetoric is addressed.30 Persuasion is a process of psychological change in 
                                                          
25 See, S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 
(1989); P. Brooks and P. Gewirtz (eds.), Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (1996); A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns 
(eds.), The Rhetoric of Law (1996); G. Wetlaufer, ‘Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse’ (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 
1545 
26 A. Sarat (ed.), Rhetorical Processes and Legal Judgments: How Language and Arguments Shape Struggles for Rights and 
Powers (2016), 127. 
27 The dictionary defines ‘advocacy’ as ‘the public support for or recommendation of a particular cause or policy’ See Soanes 
and Stevenson, supra note 21, at 25. 
28 See for example; D. Rogers, ‘Prosecutors’ Opening Statements: The Rhetoric of Law, Politics and Silent War’ in N. Hayashi 
and C. M. Bailliet (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017), 325-350; L. J. M Seymour ‘The ICC and 
Africa: Rhetoric, Hypocrisy Management, and Legitimacy’ in K. M. Clarke, A. S. Knotterus and E. de Volder (eds.), Africa 
and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (2016), 107-127; K. A. Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics: 
Embedding the International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding’ (2014) 12 JICJ 437; S. Kendall 
and S. Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridified and Abstract 
Victimhood’ (2014) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 235. 
29 See for example, M. de Hoon, ‘The Future of the International Criminal Court: On Critique, Legalism and Strengthening 
the ICC’s Legitimacy’ (2017) 17 Intl Crim L Rev 591; J. M Czarnetsky and R. J. Rychlak, ‘An Empire of Law: Legalism and 
the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 79(1) Notre Dame Law Review 55.  
30 P. Goodrich, ‘Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language’ (1984) 4(1) OJLS 88, 95. 
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recipients pertaining to their actions or beliefs, i.e. being persuaded to do, or believe something. 
31 It is inherently communicational with those seeking to persuade using language to influence 
and modify attitudes, beliefs and the existing perceptions of the audience. 32 Thus rhetoric has 
an interdependent connection to an audience that is defined as an ‘ensemble of those whom the 
speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation.’33 On the one hand, an analysis of the 
Office’s rhetoric highlights the Court’s ‘audience dilemma’; an expectation that the Court must 
‘speak to’ a range of audiences, from abstract entities (such as the ‘international community’) 
to concrete constituencies (such as victims). 34 However, by the same token, rhetoric invites 
the identification of a concrete audience upon whom the rhetoric’s persuasiveness can be 
analysed.  In so doing, rhetoric offers insight into the Office’s effectiveness in establishing a 
meaningful two-way communication to those most affected by the commission of atrocities.35  
Second, and relatedly, rhetoric is a ubiquitous social practice that has a behavioural 
impact on audiences. 36 Rhetoric, in its nature, determines the range of political ideas that 
people encounter and thus shapes the ideas that become a part of a society’s common 
understandings; helping to enable (or disable) groups to challenge existing social structures.37 
Hence, rhetoric is a component of the Office’s expressive function, namely, its broadcast of 
messages and norms that helps construct a consensus across a given society. 38 In this sense, 
rhetoric is a pedagogic tool that can cast a shadow on affected communities and in so doing, 
illuminates the Office’s effectiveness in promoting behavioural change that helps to achieve 
                                                          
31 See Soanes and Stevenson, supra note 21, at 1327. 
32 M. Dainton and E. D Zelley, Applying Communication Theory for Professional Life: A Practical Introduction (2014), 103-
4. See also G. S. Jowett and V. O. Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (2014), 38-39.  
33 C. Perelmen and L.Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1969), 19. 
34 M. R. Damaska ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 83 Chi-Kent L. Rev 329, at 347-9; M. M. 
deGuzman, ‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 33(2) Michigan Journal 
of International Law 265.  
35 See ICC Strategic Plans, supra note 16. 
36 See Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 28, at 260.  
37 K. Coe, ‘Rhetoric, Political’ in G. Mazzoleni et al (eds.), The International Encyclopaedia of Political Communication 
(2015), 1428. 
38 See T. Meijers and M. Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be expected of international criminal courts?’ 
(2016) 30 Ethics and International Affairs 429, 432-4;  M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007), 173-
9. 
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the Court’s goals e.g. the prevention of crimes and more indirectly, peace, stability and 
reconciliation. 39    
Third, rhetoric is significant for its deeper relationship with the ‘truth’. Both concepts 
are commonly understood to be hostile to one another with rhetoric having a pejorative 
association to terms such as deception, falsehood or pretence. 40 Indeed, Locke described 
rhetoric as being invented ‘for nothing else, but to insinuate wrong ideas…’41 However, 
Aristotle argued rhetoric is not inimical to truth but was necessary to enable the discovery of 
facts and to mobilise support from an audience. 42 Admittedly, rhetoric can argue the truth in 
several ways and its very contestability reinforces differing baselines with which to assess 
truth. 43 For instance disagreements about rhetoric’s claims to  truth are acute in the context of 
legal argumentation (e.g. the interpretation of facts, concepts and meanings) because both legal 
arguments and rhetoric are premised on probability rather than certainty, and thus share an ‘all-
or nothing’ desire to secure the assent of an audience.44 Nevertheless, rhetoric need not be 
approached with an a priori scepticism; rather its analysis is a heuristic technique that can 
expose an attempt at persuasion that distorts the truth. 45 Thus the rhetoric’s denial or reliance 
on truth can help determine the effectiveness of the Office’s persuasion strategy towards 
affected communities.  
                                                          
39 See M. R. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chi-Kent L.Rev 329, 343 and M.  
Minow, C. C True-Frost and A Whiting (eds.), The First Global Prosecutor: Promise and Constraints (2015), 363. The 
Office’s didactic function includes maximising the impact of its activities (e.g. the preliminary examination, investigation and 
trial) as, in its own words, ‘mere announcement of ICC activities can have a preventive impact’ See ICC OTP ‘Paper on some 
policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (September 2003), 3; See OTP ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (1 
February 2010), 7; See also DW Conflict Zone, ‘Fatou Bensouda Interview with Tim Sebastian’ (26 January 2016) available 
at <http://www.dw.com/en/storify-fatou-bensouda-on-dwzone/a-19016835>  ; F. Bensouda ‘Looking Back, Looking Ahead-
Reflections from the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC’ (2012) 11 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 437. 
40 This is captured by an alternative dictionary definition of rhetoric, noting that its persuasive effect implies a lack of sincerity. 
See Soanes and Stevenson, supra note 21, at 1524 and Goodrich, supra note 30, at 88. 
41 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book Three (1824), 41. 
42 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric in H. C. Lawson-Tancred (translation) (1991), 74 para. 1355a. 
43 I. Venzke, ‘What makes for a Valid Legal Argument?’ (2014) 11 LJIL 811, at 812-3. 
44 I. Scobbie, ‘Rhetoric, Persuasion and Interpretation in International Law’ in A. Bianchi, D. Peat, and M. Windsor (eds.), 
Interpretation in International Law (2015), 64.; Perelmen and Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 33, at 19. 
45 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 74 para. 1355a. See also Fish, supra note 25, at 479. 
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3. Methodology 
The study of rhetoric does not fit within ‘a tidy academic pigeonhole.’46 Rhetoric is a 
phenomena of multi-disciplinary interest and the literature is found, among others, within the 
disciplines of linguistics, political science and psychology. 47 For instance, in political science, 
Alan Finlayson’s development of the ‘rhetorical political analysis’ demonstrates the benefits 
of using rhetorical concepts to investigate arguments, and the ‘proofs actors bring forward in 
justifying claims and giving reasons for others to share them.’48 Similarly, rhetoric can be 
located within a ‘sister’ analysis of discourse that targets texts and ‘language in use’, and 
enables the examination of socially constructed meanings that explain the world around us.49 
Thus this article’s application of a rhetorical analysis to an international legal actor contributes 
to an emerging interdisciplinary dialogue.  
The article’s method recognises that rhetoric is instrumental to persuasion and hence 
proceeds by way of an Aristotelian analysis. For Aristotle, rhetoric was the power to observe 
the available modes of persuasion of any particular matter.50  The three classical modes of 
persuasion include: enhancing the credibility of the speaker (ethos), maximising the effect of 
the rhetoric on the emotional dispositions of its audience (pathos), and finally using deductive 
arguments to demonstrate that a particular position is true (logos).51 The present analysis adopts 
these modes as a framework to analyse the legalism within the Office’s public communications.  
Recognising the category of public communications acknowledges its collective 
importance to an organisation’s ‘public relations’. The practice of public relations is concerned 
                                                          
46 S. Condor, C. Tileaga, and M. Billig, ‘Political Rhetoric’ in L. Huddy, D O’Sears and J. S. Levy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Psychology (2013), 286. 
47  This accounts for the contested definitions of rhetoric and its interchangeable use with terms such as ‘argument’, ‘discourse’ 
and ‘language’. For an overview of these diverse disciplinary perspectives see ibid. 
48 See J. Atkins and A. Finlayson, ‘… A 40-Year Old Black Man Made the Point to Me’: Everyday Knowledge and the 
Performance of Leadership in Contemporary British Politics’ (2012) 61(1) Political Studies 161, at 162 citing originally A. 
Finlayson, ‘Political science, political ideas and rhetoric’ (2004) 3(4) Economy and Society 528. 
49 J. Gee and M. Handford, The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis (2012), 1-6.  
50 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 74 para. 1356a. 
51 Ibid. para. 1356a  
9 
 
with the ‘common meeting ground’ between an organisation and society at large, and includes 
the management of organisational reputation by a cumulative effort to influence the opinions 
and behaviour of relevant audiences.52 In respect of the Office, the Rome Statute is wholly 
silent on the agenda of public relations. Instead, it is left to  the Court’s Registry to strategically 
co-ordinate and manages the Office’s public communications across three integrated spheres 
of activity: external relations, public information and outreach. 53 The latter two activities are 
processes; public information is about articulating the principles, objectives and activities of 
the Court to the public at large and to target audiences, and outreach is about establishing a 
two-way communication with affected communities that can promote support for the Court’s 
work. However, crucially, the strategy insists on the integration of activities because they are 
‘complementary and involve mutually reinforcing goals, priorities and messages.’54 The Court-
wide public information strategy also emphasises the importance of co-ordination and harmony 
with outreach activities. 55  Thus, the Court’s public communications are based on activities 
that prioritise the significance of having a consistent message towards affected communities.56  
These communications can be motivated by any number of concerns or priorities; they 
can be made through various mediums (e.g. directly published online, by media channels or 
through the spoken word) but are essentially connected in being made public. These include 
media interviews, statements and speeches, but one might also add an equally under-scrutinised 
form of communications: policies. The Office’s published policies are motivated by 
transparency and the discharge of its mandate by way of explaining its activities, legal criteria 
                                                          
52 See E. Bernays, Crystalling Public Opinion (1961) (New Edition), at iii-iv; The Chartered Institute of Public Relations, 
‘What is PR?’ available at <https://www.cipr.co.uk/content/careers-advice/what-pr>    
53 ICC, Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach (18 April 2007), at 3. External Relations 
is the process that aims towards building and maintaining support and co-operation with the Court, and is the dialogue between 
the Court and States Parties, Non-States Parties, international organisations, NGO’s and other key partners.  
54 Ibid. at 5.  
55 See ICC-ASP/8/Res.3, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, at 5, para 33-4 
and ICC-ASP/9/29, Report of the court on the public information strategy 2011-2013, at 2, para 3.  
56 See also IBA/ICC Monitoring and Outreach Program, ICC External Communications: Delivering Information and Fairness 
(June 2011) and Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘Key Principles for ICC Communications’ (March 2015) 
available at <www.iccnow.org/documents/CommsTeamInformalCommentsRevision13MAR15.pdf>  
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and decisions. These policies continue and develop the two-way communication between the 
Office and affected communities. 57  
Nonetheless a category of ‘public communications’ can create some methodological 
limitations. Notably, it does not recognise—precisely— the aim, context, medium and 
justification of the communication. For instance, scholarship has often highlighted the 
importance of medium, pithily captured by ‘the medium is the message.’ 58 Furthermore, it 
does not acknowledge the importance of the ‘rhetorical situation’, namely, that rhetoric seeks 
to modify a set of exigencies produced by persons and/or events. 59 The category also excludes 
the more forensic attention paid to rhetoric’s arrangement, delivery and style including its 
particular argumentative scheme- a ‘topoi’ 60 alongside the use of prose and persuasive devices, 
e.g. analogy, metaphor or metonym.  61  Put simply, a category of public communications 
masks the fact that rhetoric is ‘always for, and adapted to a specific cause and a specific 
occasion.’62 
These may be reasonable reservations but the present aim is not to analyse the 
persuasiveness of every instance of legalism accounting for its aim, context, medium and 
justification. Indeed, to do so would ignore the fact that definitive judgements about persuasion 
require an empirical assessment (of individual opinions), that, in any case, is notoriously 
difficult to conduct.63 As Kant argued, actual persuasion is bound up in the character of the 
individual subject; it only has private validity and is objectively difficult to rationalise. 64 By 
                                                          
57 See OTP Policies and Strategies, available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/otp-policies.aspx> ; See also A. Coco 
and M. Cross, Foreword (Special Issue: The International Criminal Court’s Policies and Strategies) (2017) 15 JICJ 407, at 
408.    
58 This phrase is attributed to Marshall McLuhan and refers to how the precise medium of the message (rather than its content) 
has a social effect that produces its own message. See M. Mcluhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). 
59 L. F Bitzer, ‘The Rhetorical Situation’ (1968) 1 Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 
60 This translates to ‘place or location’ but in the context of Aristotle’s treatise tends to refer to a strategy for argumentation. 
See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 183-214, para. 1392a-1403b. 
61 Ibid. at 215-44, para 1404a-1414a and more generally for a range of persuasive techniques see W. Farnsworth, Farnsworth’s 
Classical English Rhetoric (2010). 
62 A. Finlayson, ‘Proving, Pleasing, Persuading? Rhetoric in Contemporary British Politics’ (2014) 85(4) The Political 
Quarterly 428, 432. Aristotle also classified rhetoric into differing genres (the deliberative, the epideictic and the judicial).  
63 See Coe, supra note 37, at 1432. 
64 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason In N. Kemp-Smith translation (1929) 645, at para A820/ B848 
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contrast, this article’s starting point is legalism, and its widespread expressions within a range 
of the Office’s public communications. In so doing, the analysis recognises that rhetoric and 
ideology are intertwined; both possess their own strategy and style of persuading a defined 
audience. 65 Thus, an analysis of the persuasiveness of legalism enables an assessment of the 
ideology of legalism too. The article turns to clarify legalism before turning to its expressions 
within the Office’s public communications.   
4. Legalism 
Most interpretations of legalism begin with the writing of Judith Shklar. Her critique in 
Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials has been described as offering the ‘single most 
significant reckoning with the politics of international criminal justice ever written.’66 In her 
view, legalism is the ‘ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following 
and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.’67 For legalists, 
rules are viewed as the only guide to decision-making, and compliance with them is a moral 
mode of being in the world. 68 Thus, legalism ascribes greatest priority to present laws (lex 
lata) and compliance with them is seen as a clear black or white, yes-or-no judgement.69  
Nonetheless, many references to Shklar tend to overlook her distinction between two 
kinds of legalism. First, a ‘professional legalism’ as the operative ideology of lawyers; internal 
to the legal profession and comprised of beliefs, habits and tendencies of rule-orientated 
lawyers. This kind of legalism consists of thinking of law as simply ‘there’, as a discrete entity, 
and is rooted in the legal profession’s view of its own functions.70 Second, a ‘political legalism’ 
                                                          
65 A. Finlayson, ‘Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies’ (2012) 60(4) Political Studies 751, 763. See generally, A. 
Finlayson, ‘Ideology and Political Rhetoric’ in M. Freeden and M. Stears (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies 
(2013) 
66 S. Moyn, ‘Judith Shklar on the Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ (2014) 14 (4/5) Intl Crim L Rev 717, at 717 
67 J. N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (1986) 111.  
68 This is associated with nullum crimen sine lege. See R. West, ‘Reconsidering Legalism’ (2003) 88 Minnesota Law Review 
119, 122 and A Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International 
Criminal Justice’ (2012) 25(2) LJIL 491, at 492. 
69 V Popovski, ‘Legality and Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’ in R. Falk, M. Juergensmeyer and V. Popovski 
(eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (2012) 408. 
70 See Shklar, supra note 67, at 35. 
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as an external projected ideology; one that is inserted into complex and diverse political 
environments that contain multiple, and often competing ideologies. 71 Here, legalism 
interprets politics as the antithesis of law; law is neutral, objective and best orientated towards 
justice; politics is rejected as competitive, egotistical and vague.72 Of course ‘political 
legalism’ produces a dichotomy that exposes an assumption: legalism views itself as ‘doing or 
solving’ political dilemmas better than politics itself can. This is the claimed virtue of legalism; 
it presents itself as an improvement on politics but, in so doing, disregards the connection that 
law has with political values because its very premise is to divorce or hide those values.73 
Before turning to the Office’s public communications, there are some fundamental 
explanations for a recourse to legalism. First, the Prosecutor is a member of an ‘interpretive 
community’ of international lawyers that possesses a set of cultural assumptions and beliefs 
that would admit a vocabulary of legalism as a matter of common sense. 74 This community is 
encompassed within an ensemble of international actors, or a broader ‘epistemic community’ 
(e.g. academics, campaigners, civil society, diplomats ) that gathered at the Rome Conference. 
Common to both communities is the use of legalism as the only ‘correct and proper’ way to 
think (and speak) about international criminal law. 75 Second, the articulation of legalism 
generally prevails across international law, and is arguably a symptom of what Martti 
Koskenniemi calls managerialism. For Koskenniemi, managerialism involves international 
lawyers placing exclusive attention on compliance with rules and technocratic practices, rather 
than having a meaningful engagement with the reasons why such rules and practices exist, and 
                                                          
71 See Shklar, supra note 67, at viii. 
72 See Shklar, supra note 67, at 111. For an alternative interpretation of ‘political’ see S. Nouwen and W. G Werner, ‘Doing 
Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2011) 21(4) EJIL 941, at 945. 
73 Z. Bankowski, ‘Don’t think about it: Legalism and Legality’ (1993) 15 Rechtstheorie Beiheft 45, at 47. 
74 The concept of interpretive community is originally attributed to the work of Stanley Fish. See Fish, supra note 25, at 141.    
See also J. d’Aspremont, ‘The Professionalization of International Law’ in J. d’Aspremont et al (eds.),  International Law as 
a Profession (2017), 30.   
75 A. Bianchi, International Law Theories (2016), 12.  
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the (political) purposes they ultimately serve. 76 In this sense, international lawyers’ use of 
legalism is, by nature, a deeply embedded community and managerial practice.   
 There have been innumerable expressions of legalism within the Office’s public 
communications. These have occurred in various contexts, over an indeterminate period of time 
and with variable frequency. It is not within the present scope to explore them all, or to attribute 
them, more or less, to the tenure of either Luis Moreno Ocampo or Fatou Bensouda. For present 
purposes, Judith Shklar’s classification of legalism can help to organise its most common 
expressions.   
Shklar’s account of professional legalism, referring to the practice of law, or its own 
discrete science, 77 helps to explain three identifiable expressions. Taking the first, the Office 
reinforces a Court-wide message that it is a judicial institution, with an exclusive judicial 
mandate. The Court’s website stresses that it is free from political control, and is only dictated 
by the legal criteria found in treaty texts.78 The content of webpages affirms that the Prosecutor 
is independent, impartial and that ‘political considerations never form part of the Office's 
decision making.’79 Secondly, and most commonly, legalism is used to demonstrate a 
commitment to professional impartiality. The Prosecutor, in many speeches, has been keen to 
declare she makes no decisions out of fear or favour.80 In so doing she, in adherence to the 
law’s neutrality and objectivity, often stresses that ‘politics and political considerations have 
no place and play no part in the decisions taken by the Office and in the execution of its 
                                                          
76 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law-20 Years Later’, (2009) 20 EJIL 7, at 15-16. 
77 See Shklar, supra note 67, at 8-9. 
78 ICC, ‘Understanding the International Criminal Court’ available at < https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf > . 
79 ICC ‘About The OTP’ available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/default.aspx> 
80 F. Bensouda, Speech at the 52nd Munich Security Conference (15th February 2014); available at 
<https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2016/speeches/speech-by-fatou-
bensouda/> ; Fatou Bensouda Speech at a seminar hosted by the Attorney General of the Federation and Ministry of Justice of 
Nigeria International Seminar (24th February 2014) available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/SpeechProsecutor-
AbujaNigeriaFra.pdf> S. Charania ‘Without Fear or Favour-An Interview with the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’ (October 
15th 2015) available at <http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/10/15/without-fear-or-favour-an-interview-with-the-icc-prosecutor-
fatou-bensouda/> ; Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, F. Bensouda: 'The Public Deserves to 
know the Truth about the ICC’s Jurisdiction over Palestine' (2nd September 2015) available at <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-st-14-09-02.aspx>  . 
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independent and impartial mandate’.81 In addition, the Prosecutor in newspaper editorials, and 
in declared policy, has reinforced legalism by insisting that the Court’s mandate will ‘never be 
compromised by political expediency.’ 82  More subtly, the third expression captures positivism 
in terms of jurisdictional limits and terminological interpretation. For instance, the Prosecutor, 
in person and in press releases, has stressed that she is only guided by the Rome Statute and 
often cites the Preamble to elaborate on her aims.83 Hence, the Prosecutor explains the 
boundaries of her decision-making by implicitly articulating the rules of treaty interpretation. 
84 Such an approach also distinguishes the Prosecutor’s professional identity; as former 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno- Ocampo once stated: ‘I follow evidence. I’m a criminal prosecutor; 
I’m not a political analyst.’85 
Shklar’s account of ‘political legalism’ helps explain two further expressions. Political 
legalism is about casting law as an uncompromising culture of rule-following that is sustained 
by depicting politics as irrational and essentially ‘a species of war’. 86 Gerry Simpson describes 
this version as ‘transcendent’ in its desire to implicate politics by law’s ruination.  87 In this 
regard, the Office makes a concerted endeavour to elevate the law’s significance as a means to 
deflect, offset (and remove) any negative association with politics. Thus, the Office uses 
legalism normatively, articulating law in terms of its contribution to political and social goals 
                                                          
81 See for example, ‘The Determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the communication received in relation to Egypt’ (8 
May 2014) available at < https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1003> .  
82 F. Bensouda, ‘The Truth about ICC and Gaza’ The Guardian, 29th August 2014 available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/29/icc-gaza-hague-court-investigate-war-crimes-palestine>; See 
OTP Interests of Justice Policy Paper (1 September 2007). 
83 The Preamble of the ICCSt. cites two main goals; ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.’ There are innumerable examples of rhetoric that refers to the ICCSt. and/or the 
Preamble; See F. Bensouda, ‘Local Prosecution of International Crimes: Challenges and Prospects’ (4th November 2014) 
Opening Remarks 7th Colloquium of International Prosecutor(s) < https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-statement-
141105.pdf> ; ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the 
situation in Palestine’ (16th January 2015) ICC Press Release <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083> . 
84 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Articles 31(1), 31(2) (General Rule of Interpretation). 
85 International Peace Institute L. Moreno-Ocampo: ‘I follow evidence, not politics’ (January 20th 2012) 
<https://www.ipinst.org/2012/01/moreno-ocampo-i-follow-evidence-not-politics> . Current Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has 
expressed similar sentiment stating: ‘We are a new tool, a judicial tool, not a tool in the hands of politicians who think they 
can decide when to plug or unplug us.’ See D. Smith, ‘New Chief Prosecutor Defends International Criminal Court’ The 
Guardian 23 May 2012. 
86 See Shklar, supra note 67, at 122.  
87 G. Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (2007), 19-20 
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particularly in the field of conflict resolution and crime prevention. The use is captured pithily 
by the words of former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, ‘…experience has taught us that law is 
the only efficient way to prevent recurrent violence and atrocities.’88 In another speech Fatou 
Bensouda provided a more striking example, complemented by a literary use of a synecdoche89, 
presenting the ICC as ‘the law’, alongside the imagery of force:   
 
I firmly believe in the power of the law to stop and prevent violence, and to pacify 
 communities gripped by conflict. I believe in the law as an instrument to affect 
 constructive change. Through the might of the law, we can highlight the brutality and 
 barbaric nature of these crimes; we can hold perpetrators accountable, and, 
 crucially… [establish] new norms of acceptable conduct. 90 
 
The Prosecutor also uses legalism creatively in casting the law as an agent of normative 
political change and thereby removing the implication that law is tainted by undesirable bias 
against states. These include, somewhat incredulously, speculating about the Court’s role in 
guaranteeing peaceful elections on the African continent. 91 In particular, and more frequently, 
the Prosecutor uses law as a metonym for justice and has expressed that the ‘law sets one 
standard for everyone...and provides justice for all.’92 This extends to describing the Court as 
                                                          
88 L. Moreno Ocampo, ‘Building a Future on Peace and Justice: The International Criminal Court’ in K. Ambos, J. Large and 
M. Wierda (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development (The 
Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice) (Springer 2009), 13. 
89 A type of metonym i.e. a figure of speech where a concept, place or thing is replaced by something closely associated to it 
e.g. ‘The Hague’ can be used to refer to the International Criminal Court. A synecdoche is specifically where a part is used to 
refer to the whole, or the whole refers to one its parts. For example ‘bread’ can be used to represent food in general as in the 
expression ‘breadwinner’ or, by contrast one can refer to a whole nation when specifically referring to its football team.    
90 F. Bensouda, ‘The investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes: reflections from the Office of the 
Prosecutor’ (24th August 2015) (The Hague Academy of International Law Advanced Course on International Criminal Law 
Special Focus: Gender Justice) available at <https://www.hagueacademy.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Opening-keynote-
speech-The-Hague-Academy-of-International-Law-Advanced-Course-on-International-Criminal-Law.pdf>   
91 ‘In Africa, for instance, there have been close to 20 presidential elections in 2012 or 2013. Most of them have gone relatively 
peacefully. I am not giving credit to the ICC for that. History will judge that, but the ICC has a role to play… I firmly believe 
the world is a better place for having the ICC as an institution. I just want us to ask this question: What would the world be 
like without an ICC?’ F. Bensouda, ‘We Should at all Costs Prevent the ICC from being Politicised’ (2014) 62(1) VEREINTE 
NATIONEN – German Review on the United Nations 
(<http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/English_Documents/Interview_Fatou_Bensouda.pdf > . 
92 F. B. Bensouda, ‘Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’ (2012) 45 V and. J. Transnat'l L 955, at 956  
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a ‘credible, professional, independent instrument of international justice’93  but also places the 
Court as the arbiter of providing a ‘real justice [that] has to be guided solely by the law and the 
evidence’94.  Taken in context, the Prosecutor’s rhetoric consistently encapsulates justice by a 
frequently-aired, ‘protected embrace of the law’95.  
The final expression of legalism finds expression in John Austin’s command or 
coercive orientation of law. 96 Legalism has a ‘strong-arm’ effect that capitalises on law’s 
ability to produce a monopoly of force and coerce compliance from other (political) actors. 97 
Taking the words of former Prosecutor Ocampo, ‘other actors have to adjust to the law’98 and, 
in the language of Fatou Bensouda, there is a dogged determination to use the ‘full power of 
the law’.99 In this guise the Office’s rhetoric presupposes the significance of the Court’s role 
in conflict-affected societies and the need for compliance. For example, in a speech in 2014, 
Fatou Bensouda stated:  
 
The ICC is a fact of life and all players in the international arena must adjust 
 their behaviour to the reality that this new player in the international scene is 
 committed to fulfilling its mandate of ending impunity for mass crimes that tear at  
the fabric of society and threaten the peace, security and well-being of the  world.100   
 
                                                          
93 F. Bensouda, Remarks to the 25th Diplomatic Briefing (26 March 2015), 5   
94 See Bensouda, supra note 92, at 959. 
95 See for example, F. Bensouda, Address at the First Plenary, ‘Fifteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties’ (16 
November 2016) 9; see also Bensouda Munich Speech, supra note 80. 
96 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).   
97 See Shklar, supra note 67, at 131. 
98 My emphasis. See L. Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ‘Keynote Address’ Council on 
Foreign Relations (4th February 2010) available at < https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A80CDDDD-8A9A-432E-97CE-
F6EAD700B5AE/281527/100204ProsecutorsspeechforCFR.pdf> . 
99 See for example, F. Bensouda, ‘Opening Remarks: Launch of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Sexual 
Violence and Gender-Based Crimes’ (7 November 2014); F. Bensouda, ‘Our Resolve to Create a More Just World Must 
Remain Firm’ (3 September 2015) <www.ictj.org/debate/article/our-resolve-create-more-just-world-must-remain-firm> 
100 F. Bensouda ‘Africa and the ICC: A Decade on.  Africa and the International Criminal Court: Lessons Learned and 
Synergies Ahead’ (9-10 September 2014) 3 available at <http://www.africalegalaid.com/news/statement-by-fatou-bensouda-
prosecutor-of-the-icc> . 
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Here, the Office’s rhetoric reinforces the mandatory nature of the Rome Statute and 
how its very existence ‘impact(s) on conflict management efforts.’101 As Office policy 
elaborates, ‘The issue is no longer whether we agree or disagree with the pursuit of justice in 
moral or practical terms. It is the law.’102 Taking more nuanced examples, Fatou Bensouda has 
regularly warned of the consequences of not supporting the ICC. For instance, she has 
contended that ‘backing the ICC is to support humanity’s progress towards a more just 
world’103 and cautioned that ‘without the ICC, we will regress into an even more turbulent 
world where chaos, volatility and violence take the upper hand as inevitable norms.’ 104 The 
implication of such rhetoric is that those who do not comply with the Rome Statute are on the 
‘wrong side’ and either accept or are indifferent to the impunity and violence the Court is 
helping to tackle.   
Admittedly, these expressions of legalism are accompanied by the adjacent language in 
the communication but this does not detract from the fact that legalism is undoubtedly one of 
the Office’s ‘key messages’; clear and short statements that are consistently reiterated. 105 This 
resonates with the Court’s Integrated Strategy and it’s stress on ‘core message themes’; 
accurate but simple messages that reach a non-specialist audience that explain the need for co-
operation and/or situate the Court as part of the international justice movement.106  Such core 
messages presupposes an organisation’s intent to use them to persuade its target audiences. The 
article now extends Shklar’s critique and exposes the limits of legalism’s persuasiveness vis-
à-vis affected communities.  
                                                          
101 OTP Policy Paper on Interests of Justice (1 September 2007) 4. 
102 Ibid.  
103 F. Bensouda, Diplomatic Briefing in The Hague (9 October 2017) 15.  
104 See Bensouda, supra note 95, at 8. 
105 Key messages are an essential part of an organisation’s public relations and regularly promoting them is part of running 
effective media and PR campaigns. This is a fundamental principle found in communications, marketing, public relations, and 
media studies literature as well as practical training materials. See A. E. Gordon, Public Relations (2011) 6-25; C. E Caroll et 
al, ‘Key messages and message integrity as concepts and metrics in communication evaluation’ (2014) 14 Journal of 
Communication Management 386, at 389.        
106 See Integrated Strategy, supra note 53, at 4-5. 
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4.1 Ethos 
For Aristotle the first rhetorical mode of persuasion concerned the character of the speaker or 
their ethos. 107 This mode is concerned with persuasion that enhances the speaker’s credibility 
and ‘must come about in the course of the speech, not through the speaker’s being believed in 
advance to be of a certain character.’108 Aristotle clarifies that a speaker’s existing credibility, 
originating within the community to which she belongs, is the strongest component of 
persuasiveness (characterised as their ‘situated ethos’).109 This ethos includes their professional  
expertise, reputation and even what Max Weber called ‘charismatic authority’; a set of 
exemplary personal leadership qualities.110 Nonetheless, Aristotle’s target is the causal flow in 
the opposing direction, namely, whether the speaker’s rhetoric can elevate their situated ethos 
in the eyes of the audience (their ‘constructed ethos’). 111 Thus, in the analysis of rhetoric, the 
speaker’s constructed ethos should, in general, elevate or remind the audience of their situated 
ethos.  
The central question that follows is whether legalism can elevate the Prosecutor’s 
situated ethos. One can answer this question by asking why legalism is attractive to lawyers. 
The answer, almost certainly, is found in its essential content: law. As Kieran McEvoy argues, 
the temptation of legalism lies within the seduction of law; its affinity to values such as 
certainty, objectivity and rationality.112 Furthermore, legalism helps articulate an ordered world 
where the law is glorious and superior because of its presumed civilising and rationalising 
function.113 This function provides law with a positive force that is boosted by the 
                                                          
107 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 74 para. 1356a. The Greek origin of the word ‘ethos’ means ‘nature or disposition’ See 
Soanes and Stevenson, supra note 21, at 601. 
108 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 74 para. 1356a. 
109 M. Burke, ‘Rhetoric and Poetics: The Classical Heritage of Stylistics’ in M. Burke (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of 
Stylistics (2014), 24-30 
110 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 141 para. 1378a and Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in H. H Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1995), 79. 
111 Ibid.  
112 K. McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ J. Law & Soc. (2008) 411, 414-
416 
113 Ibid. 416-417; See also J. Shklar, ‘In Defense of Legalism’ (1966) 19 Journal of Legal Education 51, 58. 
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condemnation that unlawful actions attract. On these terms, it is easy to see how the use of 
legalism could elevate the Prosecutor’s situated ethos.  
 This claim can be further evidenced by way of illustrating her use of professional 
legalism. Primarily professional legalism valorises the principle that lawyers mechanically 
apply their expert idiom to whatever (political) reality is presented to them. 114 It conveys 
‘safety’ and is associated with lawyers being guardians of procedural correctness e.g. it honours 
the rules of sub-judice.115 More generally, it captures legalism’s historical symbolism to use 
law (rather than violence) in response to criminality and, evokes Robert Jackson’s celebrated 
Nuremberg address.116  Finally, and unquestionably, professional legalism captures 
international criminal law’s ‘progress narrative’117 that culminated in the creation of the ICC; 
a legalistic model of justice that transcends politics. 118 This narrative idealises the delivery of 
an ‘impartial, majestic justice’119 that is based on the Court’s operational distance from the 
political contestations of domestic societies. 120  
However, much of this appeal depends on precisely how the Prosecutor’s  situated ethos 
is understood. Legalism is appealing if one understands her ethos in traditional terms: 
apolitical, conservative, client-based and based on procedural probity. 121 However, 
conversely, the Prosecutor’s situated ethos can also be understood in deeply political terms, 
                                                          
114 F. Hoffmann, ‘Facing the Abyss: International Law Before the Political’ in M. Goldoni and C. McCorkindale (eds.), Hannah 
Arendt and the Law (2012), 180.   
115 The Office’s respect for this rule is imperative after previous challenges from defence counsel and cautions from the 
Chambers about the Prosecutor’s public comments. These challenges, amongst other things, have alleged the Prosecutor’s 
public statements, including press releases, have displayed bias that is prejudicial to the fair trial of the accused. See, for 
example, The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbaruishmana, Defence Request for an Order to Preserve the Impartiality of Proceedings, 
ICC-01/04/01/10-14, 9 November 2010; The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the press interview with Ms 
Le Fraper du Hellen, ICC-01/04-01/06-2433, 12 May 2010, 19-20.      
116 e.g. to ‘submit captive enemies to the judgement of the law.’ See R. Jackson, Opening Statement, Nuremberg Trial 
Proceedings Volume 2 (Wednesday 21st November 1945) available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-21-45.asp> . 
117 Progress narratives depict a linear line of incremental development, moving from an abstract, politicised collection of 
principles to a formal, organised and legitimated framework based on law. See Andre Vartan Armenian, ‘Selectivity in 
International Criminal Law’ (2016) 16 ICLR 1, at 2; M. Windsor, ‘Narrative Kill or Capture: Unreliable Narration in 
International Law’ (2015) 28 LJIL 743, at 748-9.   
118 See Czarnetsky and Rychlak, supra note 17, at 62. 
119 See Simpson, supra note 87, at 30. 
120 P. Clark, ‘Distant Justice: The Politics of the International Criminal Court in Africa’ (27th October 2014)  available at 
<https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/distant-justice-politics-international-criminal-court-africa> . 
121 See generally K. McEvoy and R. Rebouche, ‘Mobilising the Professions? Lawyers, Politics and the Collective Legal 
Conscience’ in J. Morrison, K. McEvoy and G. Anthony (eds.), Judges, Transition and Human Rights (2007), 284 
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one more akin to a ‘cause-lawyer’: a lawyer with an activist mission to trigger social change in 
societies.122  As a cause-lawyer, the Prosecutor contributes to the Court’s goals including the 
prevention of crimes, and the promotion of peace, stability and reconciliation in affected 
communities. Her conduct encompasses the promotion of domestic prosecutions, engaging 
with civil society groups and advocating publically on behalf of victims. These are all deeply 
political activities. Crucially, her use of political legalism, championing law in the achievement 
of justice and conflict resolution, appeals more to a cause-lawyer ethos; an identity deeply 
woven with political and social activism. 123  
 Here lies the problem; the co-existence of her traditional and cause-lawyer identities 
can produce an unclear message about her relationship to politics. Her traditional ethos is based 
on a premise of political detachment, but her cause-lawyer ethos is based on a premise of 
political attachment. There is no comfortable equilibrium; her expressions of political legalism 
dilute the appeal of professional legalism, and her use of the latter betrays the fact that, outside 
the courtroom, she does not act or talk like a traditional lawyer but is closer to that of a 
campaigner. In other words, both types of situated ethos generate a friction with one another 
and produce a cognitive dissonance at the centre of the Prosecutor’s identity. From the 
perspective of affected communities that are the recipients of the Prosecutor’s rhetoric, her 
expressions of legalism are likely to confuse because they make opposing claims about her 
political positioning. Thus, one can conclude that legalism’s persuasiveness about the Court’s 
political independence, makes a much weaker appeal to ethos than is first assumed.  
                                                          
122 The literature on cause-lawyering is considerable, however for a concise overview see K. McEvoy, ‘What Did the Lawyers 
Do During the War’? Neutrality, Conflict and the Culture of Quietism’ (2011) 74(3) MLR 350, 354.  
123 For example, see the many references to victims in Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the UNSC on the 
Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (13th December 2016) 
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4.2. Pathos 
The purpose of pathos in rhetoric is to elicit emotional support among the audience at which 
the rhetoric is targeted. 124 Pathos is about the stirring of an emotional disposition and 
consequently rhetoric must recognise that the judgements of an audience will differ when they 
are aggrieved or pleased, sympathetic or in a state of revulsion. 125 For Aristotle, the rhetorician 
must understand a range of emotions (e.g. anger, pity, fear, favour and envy) to help inform 
the use of rhetoric that, ideally, can heighten its degree of persuasion. 126  
 To address whether legalism can elicit emotional support among affected communities, 
one must acknowledge the indeterminacy of ‘emotional support’. Emotion is a complex, 
psychological and highly subjective phenomena. Hence rhetoric’s appeal to emotion can only 
be based on a general presupposing of an audience’s perceptions; what they will perceive 
positively and be willing to emotionally accept. Of course, no single audience is a tabula rasa 
but is, in fact, comprised of individuals that carry socially conditioned beliefs and convictions. 
127 Similarly, the degree and nature of ‘support’ is open to interpretation. Rhetoric can attract 
a range of support although it need not be of a degree that conclusively leads to persuasion, but 
should, as a minimum, establish a foundation for persuasion. This foundation may rest on 
‘diffuse support’; a reasonable and stable acceptance of an institution but that does not always 
extend to satisfaction with its every decision.128 However, in this sense, legalism’s appeal to 
pathos within affected communities is likely to be limited.   
First, legalism’s primary appeal is to notions of legality but, lacks a commensurate 
appeal to perceived legitimacy wherein emotion is located. Legality is the belief in the validity 
                                                          
124 Pathos is quality that tends to evoke a particular emotional disposition and is most often associated with sadness or 
sympathy. See Soanes and Stevenson, supra note 21, at 1302. 
125 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 74 para. 1356a. 
126 See Aristotle, supra note 42, at 139-171 para. 1378b-1388b. 
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of a statute, rationally created rules and the discharge of statutory obligations. 129 By contrast, 
perceived legitimacy is a psychological acceptance or belief in an entity’s authority and right 
to rule. 130 It is a phenomenon shaped by a range of causes that help to produce an individual’s 
perceptions. These can be described as audience ‘anchors’ 131 and can be based on their ethnic, 
political, religious or social affiliations. These anchors, in turn, can produce cognitive biases 
and emotionally-driven reasoning that hardens resistance towards messages countering those 
anchors. 132 Rhetoric thus should target those anchors because emotional persuasion requires 
altering sets of internal assumptions that make up a listener’s frame of reference. 133 In this 
light, legalism offers too little as its privileging of legality is, at best, only a component of 
perceived legitimacy but does not exhaust it. In so doing, legalism circumvents the complex 
blend of affiliations that make up individual perceptions within affected communities. 134 
 Second, and relatedly, legalism’s limited appeal to emotion can be attributed to its very 
uniformity.  Legalism’s attraction is that it is a general ‘one size fits all’ rhetoric that speaks to 
multiple audiences at the same time. However, the Office’s prevalent usage imagines a single, 
and rather abstract audience; something that finds expression in the concept of a ‘universal 
audience’—namely a systematized construction in the mind of the speaker of an ideal audience 
capable of assenting to its claims. 135 This being the case, the universal audience is not a 
concrete or material entity (with typically diverse sectional interests) but is constructed by the 
rhetoric (and the speaker) itself.136 Leaving the conceptual concerns aside, one could defend 
the uniformity of legalism if it had general emotional utility; however, it is not clear that it does 
                                                          
129 See Weber, supra note 110, at 79.  
130 There is considerable literature on perceived legitimacy. Most definitions associate the concept with sociological (or 
Weberian) legitimacy. See S. Vasilev, ‘Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: Theorising Legitimacy’ in N. 
Hayashi and C. M. Bailliet (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017); H. Takemura, ‘Reconsidering 
the Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 4(2) Amsterdam Law Forum 4 
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have such utility. The appropriate starting point for such a determination is to  identify the 
emotion legalism seeks to inspire. In the most part, legalism makes the same general 
assumption that its audience lacks confidence in the Court’s detachment from politics. The 
question thus becomes whether legalism does inspire such confidence among affected 
communities.   
 Aristotle explained confidence as requiring ‘the remoteness of fearsome things and the 
proximity of salutary ones.’137 In other words, the near presence of something can inspire a 
belief in the certainty or favourability of something, combined with the distancing of whatever 
causes distrust or a lack of belief.138  However, on these terms, it is not at all convincing that 
legalism does inspire confidence but, rather, can become somewhat self-defeating. It is the 
perception of the Court’s politics including its bias that is legalism’s target for persuasion. 
However, paradoxically, the use of legalism and its combined stress on law and the Rome 
Statute is, if anything, likely to remind affected communities of the Court’s spatial and moral 
distance. In so doing, legalism maintains the Court’s distance, rather than helping to collapse 
it and thus, perpetuates the existing space for distrust about its politics.     
  There is further reason to doubt legalism’s ability to inspire confidence. Lying within 
legalism is an emotional deficit, one it produces by encouraging a disconnection between the 
law and the political. However, in the space between law and politics lies the value that is of 
most emotional concern to affected communities: justice. For legalists, the pursuit of justice is 
articulated and understood as the intensification of legalism.139 By contrast, and at a minimum, 
affected communities are likely to perceive legalism as insufficiently expressive of justice 
because justice is pluralistic, and politically and socially constructed. In conflict-affected 
societies, many non-legal mechanisms and strategies (e.g. truth and reconciliation 
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24 
 
commissions,) can contribute to justice processes. To argue, as legalism does, that law has a 
monopoly on justice often leads to international criminal tribunals overselling their ability to 
achieve truth and reconciliation and other goals associated with post-conflict nation building. 
140 Legalism, thus, tends to engender perennial disappointment; its preference for a simple 
answer cuts through the moral ambiguities of justice. 141 For the potential victims of crimes, 
the position is aptly surmised by Kamari Maxine Clarke: ‘We ask for justice, you give us 
law.’142 Hence, the resulting impact of legalism on affected communities is likely to do little 
to build confidence; it over-promises and subsequently under-delivers.  
 One can predict that legalism is unlikely to produce sufficient pathos to persuade 
affected communities of the Court’s political independence. This is not to say that legalism has 
no emotional appeal; one could argue that legalism inspires emotional certainty. This might be 
appealing to some within affected communities that have endured the sheer lawlessness that 
can give rise to the commission of atrocities. But even then, legalism is ill-equipped to appeal 
to pathos because it closes the space for emotional acknowledgement in its urgency to point to 
law as a remedy. Put another way, it is inextricably bound with the telos of rhetoric: victory 
rather than cure. 143 In contrast legalism is far better-equipped at reinforcing the pre-existing 
pathos of idealistic international criminal lawyers that refuse to acknowledge the Court’s 
complex political dimensions. 144 Undeniably, legalism epitomises the Office’s own 
organisational ‘personality’ and is symptomatic of its own ideological ‘echo-chamber’ 145 One 
can conclude that legalism is highly persuasive for communities of international lawyers 
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disposed to agreement, but will generally lack persuasiveness within affected communities that 
do not share such a disposition.  
4.3. Logos 
Aristotle’s principle of logos pertains to the central principles of logic, reason and proof. 146 
He drew a distinction between logic and rhetoric; logic is rooted in arguments based on 
certainty, reason and truth, and rhetoric is rooted in persuasive techniques about subjects based 
on possibilities and probabilities. 147 However, for logic to be persuasive, he stressed the role 
of rhetorical syllogisms, (or more specifically an enthymeme) and the demonstration of 
reasoning to show that something is the case. 148  Building on his previous work on dialectics, 
Aristotle argued that syllogisms are based on a process of deduction.149 Deductive arguments 
thus tend to adopt a ‘major or minor premise-conclusion’ structure.  A common example of 
this is ‘All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.’150  
However, as Aristotle discussed, rhetoric often omits certain premises that would 
otherwise be significant in dialectical practice.151 One could not expect the audience of rhetoric 
to follow through several deductive steps, so a general premise can be located within a sign 
argument. A sign is an inductive presentation of something existing that the audience, a priori, 
needs to accept, so that a syllogism can be derived and a valid deduction established. To provide 
Aristotle’s example, ‘He is ill, since he has a fever.’ This is an example of a syllogism that 
cannot be refuted if the sign of having a fever is true, as, ergo, he must therefore be ill (as it is 
not possible to be otherwise).152   
                                                          
146 The Greek origin of the term logos is ‘word, reason’.  Logos is also the origin of the word logic. See Soanes and Stevenson, 
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Turning to the Prosecutor’s use of legalism, one may analyse its rhetorical structure in 
the following way.  First, the implicit sign argument is that the law is neutral in all matters. 
Flowing from the sign, is an indication of legalism’s major premise that, the law rejects the 
political. Thus, the intended conclusion from this premise is that the Prosecutor’s decision-
making cannot contain political factors and hence any given decision is not political. At first 
glance, this syllogistic structure may be deductively persuasive, but the underlying question is 
the extent to which both the sign argument and the major premise withstand scrutiny.  If both 
the sign and the major premise are demonstrably questionable, then the persuasiveness of 
legalism is commensurately reduced.  
  In relation to the sign argument, to accept that the law is neutral ignores the extent to 
law is a technique for ‘ends prescribed by politics’, or simply, that law is politics transformed. 
153 It is no news that there is a politics of international (criminal) law, 154 but what is critical is 
how the law’s logic is perceived. Here, the perception the sign argument is attempting to 
maintain is unlikely to be sustainable. Inevitably, individuals within affected communities, or 
simply the ‘man in the street’ tend to personify the law by questioning its very origin in the 
political order. 155 In short, ‘…the law is not an abstraction. It cannot be understood 
independently of the political foundation on which it rests and of the political interests which 
it serves.’ 156  Thus, a given perception of law is shaped not only by one’s background and 
personal perspective, but crucially, the p,olitical system in which law exists.  
 Of course, the evaluation of the major premise does not escape a similar set of 
criticisms. The law is not perceived in a vacuum and thus legalism (and its inherent 
minimalism) is likely to be perceived as simply endorsing the structural biases of the Court. If 
one is critical of these biases and views them as part of the problem, then, the only concern is 
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whether institutions are good and the decisions they make are the right ones. 157 Here, legalism 
is also weak because it is inherently unable to provide an answer to the most relevant normative 
question. The question legalism prefers to answer is simply whether the law admits the 
political, but, the more normative question being asked, that legalism fails to answer, is what 
sort of politics is legalism maintaining?158  
Further evidence of legalism’s logical weaknesses can be located in the Prosecutor’s 
use of professional legalism and its insistence that rule application and rule following does not 
accommodate political factors. The insistence, however, unravels if one looks closely at the 
rules themselves. Of course, one might argue that all rules provide general categories into 
which particular (political) situations need to fit. 159 This being true, it is undoubtedly the case 
that the Court’s jurisdiction is based on a set of rules that are intrinsically permeable to political 
considerations.    
 Principally, the Office’s selections all require a degree of political assessment.  These 
begin with whether to accept a referral to the Court by either a government (including a self-
referral), or by the  UNSC in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or whether to  
initiate an investigation propio motu (on his/her impulse). 160 At this stage the Office may make 
a political judgment in selecting a situation and often resorts to making a determination about 
whether the situation is of ‘sufficient gravity.’161  Furthermore, under Article 53(1) (a)-(c) of 
the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must consider admissibility i.e. the tests of ‘complementarity’ 
and ‘gravity’ 162 and determine whether to decline to proceed with an investigation or 
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prosecution ‘in the interests of justice’.163 By nature these are judgements that cannot be based 
on applying legalistic criteria, but are shaped by political sensitivities.164 These sensitivities are 
also incorporated in the final choice of defendant, who, in principle, ought to hold ‘the greatest 
responsibility’ for the most serious crimes. 165 And yet, selecting the ‘best’ individual to 
prosecute requires a blend of objective and subjective determinations that reconciles available 
evidence, enforcement capability, and other prosaic questions such as how limited resources 
should be directed. 166 Moreover, international criminal prosecution policies (and therefore 
selection decisions), inherently, account for the social context of conflict settings.167  Thus, the 
logical weakness of legalism’s major premise is its betrayal of the Prosecutor’s decision-
making realities; it masks the ‘politics in law’ by presenting law as an autonomous and 
independent framework, but politics gives the Prosecutor her ‘rough content’ and driving 
force.168 To put it rather bluntly, legalism presents a vision of law ‘as legalism wants it to be, 
not as it actually is.’ 169  
 It might be said these logical weaknesses only apply in reference to professional 
legalism and the same cannot be said with respect to political legalism. However, the 
Prosecutor’s use of political legalism tends to produce its own fallacy. Its use is based on 
improving the state of politics by advancing the law as a remedy for justice and conflict 
resolution, and, by mandating compliance and co-operation from other political actors. 
However, political legalism’s premise is to simultaneously dismiss and marginalise politics 
and so cannot, effectively, improve the environment in which politics is actively operating . 170 
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In fact, this kind of legalism maintains a pretence of political agnosticism so it can champion 
law as the ‘better’ politics, but this bias towards formalism simply reflects the law’s value (and 
misery) of being the surface upon which political preferences are contested.171 In this sense, 
the Prosecutor’s use of political legalism is completely circular; it reproduces the tensions 
between law and the political, rather than helping to address those tensions. 
  There are thus significant reasons to doubt that legalism provides a logical or rational 
explanation of the Court’s political independence. That does not mean to say, that which is 
demonstrably rational, is always persuasive. Rationalism does not have a monopoly on what 
someone believes to be true. Truth is contested and incommensurable; an individual may not 
believe a rational truth in favour of other ‘truths’ that subjectively conforms to emotional 
disposition. For instance in conflict societies where myths and revisionism are rife, people may 
be more willing to believe emotional accounts that have come to acquire a ‘logic of their 
own.’172 On that basis, and as explained earlier, legalism lacks an emotional resonance that has 
come to, increasingly in today’s society, drive persuasion.173 Furthermore, as this section 
identified, legalism lacks sufficient logical support and, at best, enjoys only an ‘appearance of 
veracity’ that is likely to further limit its persuasiveness among affected communities.    
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
In today’s political climate the motives behind rhetoric are increasingly the object of distrust, 
particularly, its ability to confuse claims about objective truth. One could argue this is merely 
the continuation of a historical trend; from Plato to figures of the enlightenment many have 
subscribed to the view that rhetoric is a ‘machinery of persuasion [that]… can never fail to rid 
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one completely of the lurking suspicion that one is being artfully hoodwinked.’ 174  At the 
centre of philosophical distrust is the belief that rhetoric is inherently antagonistic to 
rationalism. This article has not argued that rhetoric ought to defeat rationalism but rather 
began, as Aristotle argued, on the premise that rationalism depends on rhetoric if facts and 
logic is to be persuasive.   
In this light, the article outlined that, in the context of affected communities lacking 
trust in the Court’s independence, the Office of the Prosecutor has adopted a rhetoric relying 
on legalism.  A rhetorical analysis of legalism reveals it makes a weak appeal to ethos, has a 
limited appeal to pathos, and, perhaps most troublingly, does not possess sufficient logos to 
demonstrate its premise is true. Legalism, as the art of rhetoric, has limited persuasiveness and 
leads to the conclusion that it is a weak tactic of legitimation. Legalism, as a statement of fact, 
lacks verifiability and leads to the conclusion that its promises are hollow. In combination, one 
might contend that instances of legalism are disingenuous and utterances of a platitude that can 
have a delegitimising effect; the exact opposite of what is intended. Just as soberly, it helps 
make the case that legalism, as the progress narrative of international criminal law, is becoming 
well-worn. 
 It is hoped this article may stimulate renewed research in the direction of 
communication strategies, and the content and effect of rhetoric on specific audiences. It 
follows that this article may also have implications for other international legal actors and 
institutions; specifically, their rhetoric in public communications, attempts at legitimation and 
their desire to improve perceived legitimacy within essential audiences. The political 
independence of international institutions is all too frequently attacked and their response to 
such attacks often requires rhetoric that accommodates persuasion and rationalism—qualities 
that are not mutually exclusive but should be made to depend on one another. Otherwise, and 
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using the Office as an example, if rhetoric was to prioritise persuasion then it would 
dangerously invite the use of subterfuge and could fundamentally undermine the Court’s 
legitimacy. Alternatively, if rhetoric were to prioritise rationalism then it would admit the 
Court’s real political dependencies, but that would undermine the effectiveness of any 
persuasion strategy and could be no less detrimental to the Court’s legitimacy. Admittedly, 
those intent on seeing bias will locate every means to do so, and other actors (e.g. the media or 
political elites) may be more effective at influencing public opinion. Nonetheless, however 
futile the endeavour, it does not follow that institutional persuasion strategies should be 
abandoned. The consequences of doing so are likely to be considerably more damaging than a 
strategy that has only a slight or modest impact. Put simply, silence is unaffordable. In this 
light, the following recommendations may help the Office improve its rhetoric towards those 
communities that are essential to the Court’s perceived legitimacy.  
 First, the recognition of legalism’s limited persuasiveness does not mean that the Office 
should abandon it within its public communications. To recognise legalism’s limits of 
persuasion is not to argue for its premature removal as changes in organisational rhetoric should 
occur incrementally. Rhetoric may need to be sustained in the medium term in spite of limited 
persuasion e.g. for continuity and consistency in messaging. In any case, in spite of its flaws, 
displacing legalism is no easy task, for it is deeply entrenched within the minds of international 
criminal lawyers; it is not only a way of saying, but a habitual way of acting and thinking.175 
That being the case, the Office, in the interim, might carefully reflect on its language 
surrounding legalism, and the way in which it, generally, can compensate for legalism’s 
shortfall in ethos, pathos and logos. This could include a renewed thoughtfulness as to diction, 
narrative and style, and further explanation as to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Office’s desire 
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to maintain legalism and be ‘on message’ does not exclude a more imaginative exercise of 
rhetoric elsewhere.      
 Second, the Office should commit to a deeper understanding of emotional anchors 
within affected communities (including those that originate in ethnicity, nationality, political 
preference etc.) With a more judicious use of empirical research and survey data, her public 
communications should specify exactly the audience perceptions that she intends to speak to, 
and her rhetoric can thus be more context sensitive and culturally-specific. 176 Her 
communications can then be subject to later empirical evaluation as to an alteration or change 
in opinions.  This is not an argument for her to pander to emotions, but to genuinely understand 
them, and so, develop a more meaningful two-way dialogue. This might require the 
development of counter-narratives or stories that defend the Court by speaking to ‘head and 
heart alike.’177 This is no doubt challenging, but if the Office’s rhetoric wants to compete in 
what it sees is a ‘marketplace of falsehoods’ about the Court, then, it must start to meaningfully 
recognise the emotional imperatives of those to whom the rhetoric is addressed.  
 Finally, the Office’s use of persuasive rhetoric is not an end in itself. Persuasive rhetoric 
will not mean that which is criticised will be improved, or indeed, forgotten. Rhetoric is 
accompanied by what a listener sees and if reality significantly diverges, then rhetoric will 
become cyclic and forever doomed to disappoint; generating false expectations and re-
entrenching cynicism. For some critics, the Court may never be able to demonstrate its political 
independence and even, its ultimate worth. Be that as it may, current evidence suggests there 
is a compelling case for the Office to manage expectations with rhetoric that is humble in its 
promises. And so, the Prosecutor would be wise to avoid striking triumphalist tones that merely 
detaches the Court from the communities that are its raison d'être. 
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